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DOE review completed.

MEMORANDUM FOR:	<div></div> Arms Control Intelligence Staff	✓
FROM:	Executive Assistant to the DDCI	
	<div>Executive Registry</div>	
Doug:	<div>85- 4879</div>	
DDCI asked D/DIA for this study, and he said he'd provide it.		
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<div>DOE review completed.</div>		
Date 13 December 1985		

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SA/DCI/IA.

ACIS - 1649/85
4 December 1985MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence

--EYES ONLY--

FROM:

[REDACTED]
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT: Status Report on Soviet Nuclear Testing (C/NF)

1. This "fast-track" memorandum is both for your information and action, and you may care to issue instructions/guidance. (U)

2. As you no doubt recall, US intelligence and certain portions of the Defense and DOE technical communities have been working hard during the last year on the issue of how to best characterize the [REDACTED] yields of Soviet underground nuclear tests. Recently, you received from the Director of DIA the final report of the Technical Review Panel conducted by DIA, in response to your request earlier in 1985. Chairman, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee and I have the action (albeit delayed slightly), from the Executive Secretary, to provide you comments on this DIA study. (C/NF)

3. In this regard, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) has been addressing what to recommend to you [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It became fairly clear Tuesday at a JAEIC meeting that DIA wants to delay a decision and may even disagree with the results of the technical review panel it conducted. Ch/JAEIC will be forwarding to you eventually a recommendation (including differing views, if any) in the near future. (C/NF)

4. Concurrently, the Executive Branch has been working on a number of arms control compliance issues for the report to the Congress mandated by the FY 86 Defense Authorization Bill. That report, originally due on 1 December, has been tentatively slipped by the Executive Branch to 20 December--just before Congress adjourns. As this work has proceeded and the results have arrived from the various DoD technical panels, it has become increasingly clear that the consensus in the Executive Branch of 1984 on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) compliance issue has fractured--probably permanently. (This is no great loss, in my view.) (C/NF)

DCI
EXEC
REG

SECRET/NOFORN

5. The instant problem for me is that:

-- The compliance decision paper, including a section on the TTBT, will be under Executive Branch review beginning Thursday, and I need to have a DCI position about the number of Soviet tests [redacted] above 150 kt. 25X1
25X1

-- The JAEIC is unable, because of DIA actions (or lack of them), to recommend to you at present a position [redacted] so that you can instruct me formally as to your views. (C/NF) 25X1
25X1

6. Thus, I propose that in the Executive Branch policy considerations beginning on Thursday, I use the following technically-oriented position in the appropriate places:

[redacted] 25X1

7. Please note that the above paragraph does not address the policy issue of Soviet compliance. I continue to believe that this is a substantive issue where the DCI should not take a position on the policy question itself. The policy agencies will express their views on the intelligence material and come to a conclusion on the policy question, as they have in the past, on their own. (C/NF)


8. Perhaps more importantly, as was necessary some three months ago, I ask that you raise with the Defense Department in your next weekly breakfast with either Secretary Weinberger or Deputy Secretary Taft the fact that DoD is unwilling or unable to provide a copy of an additional DoD intelligence report on technical analysis of Soviet underground nuclear tests. [redacted]

A copy resides in DIA and DIA is [redacted] 25X1

unwilling or unable to provide a copy to either Ch/JAEIC or CIA. Our understanding is that this new report reinforces the conclusions of the DIA Technical Review Panel. Whatever the results, we need this report and at present the only likely way we are going to get it is as a result of your request. (C/NF)

9. This memorandum has been read by the Acting Director, OSWR and the Chairman/JAEIC; they concur and any views have been incorporated. (OUO)

10. If there is anything further we can do to assist you here, please call and let me know. (U)



25X1